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Both at the time and since,'. _the ·proposal o~ June 1950 bX 
the French Fore~gn Minist.er· Robe:r;-'.t SchU1-nann---that the coal and 
steel industries of Weste:r;-n Europe form a giant pool, .under the 
supervision of their gover·nments, with the authority to work 
out jointly matters of common concern-~-has been recognized as 
a master stroke in twentieth century European diplomacy. And 
indeed it was. The French Foreign Minister provided a bold, 
innovative, and, as events would prove, eminently workable 
solution to one of the most vexing problems with which the u.s. 
State Department, and Europe generally, .struggled in the five 
years following the defeat and collapse of the Third Reich. This 
wa-s to provi.de France and the other nations directly dependent 
on the Ruhr---all former victims of national socialist aggression---
at least a measure of control over the industries of the region 
even after they had been restored to private control •. Or, to 
state the matter another way: it was to supply an international 
solution to "The Ruhr- Problem" .on the basis of capitalism. 
The striking originality of Schumann's proposal derived in 
good measure from the fact that it rested on traditions little 
understood in the United states and in more or less ill-repute in 
western Europe and-·Great Britain. ' They grew out of over a generation's •· 
efforts on the part of the coal and steel producers of Germany, 
France, and the Benelux nations to work out privately, altho~gh 
often with the assent and cooperation of their governments, the 
various economic and political problems facing them: as a whole. 
·I 
I 
This 11 bu·siness di.J?lomacy, ". which was conducted · both formally 
and informally, .found institutional expression in, ,but -also went 
£ar beyond, .such arrangements as the International Steel Cartels 
. of the :late-l:920s and 1930s., _the bilateral agreements of the 
.I)epression for regulating coal markets. in· Western Eu.rope, and 
the machinery of the European war economy that operated in the 
years from 1940 to 1944. What Schumann proposed, then, was to 
·update _such practices in the interests both of European prosperity 
and eventual ?ranco-German political reconciliation. 
The Schmnann_Plan culminated five years of attempts to solve· 
-
11 The- Ruhr Problem" in which the initiative shifted from the 
governments of the three Western World War II Allies, _and the U.S. 
in particular, to the coal and steel industries of Western Europe. 
This transferance wa:s partly intentional---occupation rule was 
always intended to be temporary--~and partly due to new mood 
engendered by the Cold War. In the end,· however, it was due to 
a lack of better alternativeso - The U.S. had simply.run out of 
ideas for The Ruhr Problem. A "European" solution had somehow 
therefore to be found. 
11.s. policy towards the Ruhr during the years of Military 
Government aimed at both reform and recovery. The heavy industry 
. . 
of the region was-to be purged of those persons and practices which 
·(it was believed) had given rise to Hitlerism, restored to "normal" 
operation, and then integrated.into the European economy. But 
while these objectives commanded universal agreement in principle, 
in practice they proved difficult to implement to the satisfaction 
of all-parties concerned .. This was true with regard both to the 
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reo":C"ganization of Ruhl;" industry and its re;lnteg:ration into the 
Europea·n economy. 
In the first case,· _the ·u .s •· cannot blame the wartime Allies 
for fail~re; it "shot .itself in the ·foot." The reform pr~gram 
of OMGUS* was that of "trust-busting.". But as a result of·a 
dispute of extraordinary bitterness, those representing this 
position were·uncererrioniously "sacked,". leaving "practical" 
industrialists and financiers in exclusive charge of economic 
policy. Thei:r:- sole aim was to restore conditions of "business 
as usual." The job of reforming Ruhr industry, then, would 
eventually fall to the Germans themselves. Within the i:nan~gement 
of the giant. Ruhr Konzerne were, _however, to be found men for 
whom defeat was an opportunity as well as a catastrophe, and 
t.hey veri t'ably seized upon the occasions it offered to introduce · 
long overdue changes necessary to restore the-competitiveness 
of industry. In short, they managed during the bleak years from 
1945 to 1949 to achieve a "nee-capitalist restoration" which, 
__ ;:----,~-- -~ 
if it in some ways broke from the past, still preserved the: 
essential con·ti_nuity of German business -traditions. 
As for the second objective of u.s. policy---the reintegration 
of the Ruhr into the European economy---it proved impossible 
diplomatically __ to- enlist the governments of France and Britain, 
and eventually West Germany as well, into a workable scheme of 
international control. Indeed, _the French Government remained 
insistent on displacing industrial power from the Ruhr, the British 
Government faced too many pressing problems elsewhere, and the 
*Offi~e of Military Government, U.S. 
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west ·.Germans by mid-1948 had_ gained eno~gh confidence to reject . 
in principle the ·control of R,uhr· industry by anx foreign_ government. 
Instead, it .fell to the leader·s of Rhine and R,uhr to propose to 
their French counterparts a revival of the interwar schemes· for 
international cooperation. And, _in the end, political conditions 
being propitious, .Foreign Minister Schumann took them up. 
In the economic policy of OMGUS a vast gap separated word 
from deed. JCS 1067, issued in April 1945 but made public only 
in October, provided the initial "marching orders" for the Ameriean 
occupation authoritie-s. Consistent with a cornmi:tment of Preside,,1t 
Truman's from Potsdam, it subordinated German economic recovery 
to the provision of reparations in kind from·the Western Zones 
as corpensation to the Russians, but also the French,.for losses 
suffetred during the war. The March 1946 Levels-of-Industry Agreement, 
which! was to implement· JCS 1067 ,. set allowable output maxima 
indu+ry-by-industry on t.he basis of. both reparations. requirement$ 
and G1rmany' s pre_sumed peacetime needs. P:t._ants-" ~n. the armam~n~s secto,r were to be shut down, manufacture for -civilian necessities 
permi,lted, and the output of raw ~terial, coal in particular, 
encouraged to facilitate European recoveryc Such restraints were 
never, however, allowed to interfere with German 1 recovery. 
Irideed new reasons-·were ·consistently found to increase the limits 
on·ojtput to ievels above Germany's capacity to produce, be they, 
to prevent famine, cover the material requirements of the forces of 
occup[ation, _li.ghten the 
economic reconstruction 
the ~readed Red T.ide. · 
I -
burden on the U.S. taxpayer, promote 
outside of Germany, _or build dikes against 
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Within OMGUS, however., .. the policy-:-ma.ki!lg process resembled 
nothi!lg more than a m~ghty t~g--:--o:e-.-war betweeri the ·advocates- of 
"reform first'' and ''recovery first"- in which the latter, _overcoming 
an initial disadvantage, .eventually put the former to rout. The 
struggle was fought over those provisions in JCS 1067 which, 
as a medium-term objective, _called for. the "deconcentration of 
German industry." 
'1 
This term was understood to mean the break up 
Jf the huge trusts and cartels dominating the German economy which 
Jere believed to have played a major rc.tle in bringing Hitler to 
I ~ower and in supporting his nefarious r:.i~s. 2 Allied Control Council 
I 
r;iaw No. 9 was a first possible step in this direction. Acting 
. j 
under its authority, .OMGUS seized the assets of I.G. Farben, 
i 
I 
tjusted its management, and began the process of its organizational 
dismantlement---measures facilitated by the fact that the 
! 
headquarters of the giant chemical complex were located in the 
' I 
American Zone. Indeed, they had been taken over as offices 
i 
' for the U.S. occupation government! 
i 
·The Ruhr, _however, _was in the British Zone and therefore beyond 
immediate American reach until 1 January 1947, _when the Fusion 
Agreement which created Bizonia took effect. The U.K. had its 
own policy priorities, which it intended to_follow as long as its 
own strength vis-··a· vis the Americans_ permitted~ "Anti-trust II meant 
l'ittle in Britain. Opinion with regard.to industrial organization 
in the Ruhr was in fact divided between advocates of natiorialization 
(as a parallel to events at home) and a return to the status quo 
ante bellum. More important still, .London subordinated Ruhr policy 
generaily to a larger concern with the Dollar shortage. 
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It .is in l~ght o~ these .con·sider·ations that :qne must view 
the actions taken by the British Milita,ry Gover.Ill(le.rit under. Law 
No. 52, .which .provided the :1eg·a1 basis :f;o;r;- parallel measures to 
those taken in the U. s. Zone with regard to I. G·. 1:1 arben. It 
launched the process of; industrial reorganization in the Ruhr. 
Law No. 3 pursuant to it put ''under control" the assets of 
Friedrich Krupp---a special measure taken in anticipation of 
prosecu~J:on. __ Order. No. 5 provided for the seizure of coal asi:,ets,. 
·_;;. 
and Order No. 7, thos7 iri the steel industry~ To supervise·,. - - . ' 
the--two·industries the North German Coal Council (NGCC) and the -
North German Iron and Steel Authority were set up. Their actual 
management was, .however, the job of two German-run executive 
arms, the Deutsche Kohlenbergbau Leitung (DKBL) for coal and 
the so-called Treuhandverwaltung or Steel Trusteeship as it was 
ca.lled in English. It was intended that. these organizations would 
be temporary, eventual disposition of the assets in question to 
be determined by Germans themselves. At the same time, however, 
the first steps towards reorganization were taken. These were 
the "separation" of. the coal mines from their parent Konzerne 
and "Operation severa~ce," which split up the former trusts and 
re-grouped their steel plants into twenty-eight new production 
units. British __ motivations behind the adoption of these measures, 
including that of appeasing the lµnericans, were practical in 
nature. One·was to restore cost .accountability---a matter of 
particular· importance :in coal, _the main reparations .. CJOOd, .whose ex-
portation the British would be called upon to :f;inance. A. more 
imp9rtant one, however, was to facilitate economic recovery. This 
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would require a massive .e;f;Jort at :the top and the ·.enlistment of 
all politically acceptable ~erinan leadership_ groups. In this 
connection must be. mentioned the ·provisions made :for the 
representation of labor in both German executive ·arms and of 
the introduction of Mitbestimrnung in coal.- Beyond these somewhat 
limited objectives, the British had no specific plans for industrial_ 
reorganization. The use of Law 52 as a means of decartelizing 
.the Ruhr would, in particular, depend less on ·Br·itish policy than 
the outcome of the bitter factional dispute that :i;-aged in OMGUS 
during the first year and a half of its existence. 3 
It provides an early instance of how the triumph of the Cold 
war mentality in u.s. policy-making circles paved the way for 
the eventual restoration of traditional interests in the Ruhr. 
The struggle centered on James Stewart Martin, _Chief of the 
Decarte.lization Branch of the Economic Division of OMGUS. His 
off ice·- was set up un~er the provisions of JCS 1067 calling for 
"the_dispersion.of the ownership and control of German industry." 
Although he reported directly to Military Governor Clay, Martin 
had few specific powers& The authority to enact a decartelization 
law rested with the Military Governor who, _in the meantime directed 
him to" ••• make a survey of combines and pools, mergers, holding 
. 4 
companies and -interlocking •directorates" in the German economy. 
Martin had been selected to run the anti-trust lobby in OMGUS 
through the influence of Senator Harley Kilgore of west Virginia 
and could count on support .for his activities from a large segment 
of the American· public. The Decartelization Branch Chief, who 
had been a lawyer on the staff of the great Thurman Arnold at 
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Justice, .believed profoundly in the ·complicity of the German 
industrial leadership in havi~g promoted Hitlerism and was also 
convinced that the :big businessmen of other nations shared ·,_,,;; 
. 
the ·nurden of guilto Martin had arrived as such a conviction 
as an investigator specializing in the study of the ways in which 
international cartel arrangements had interfered in the u.s~ 
prosecution of the war. In short, _he viewed his work as part of. 
a larger effort to rid capitalism of its evils. His lodestar 
was not, .. howev,"!r, .socialism but the restoration of the market 
economy. Alth0ugh he was a strenuous advocate of dismantling 
the war-making· potential of Reich industry, and of course 
"detrustifying" the giant organizations, there was nothing in 
Martin's plans that called either for the confiscation of private 
property or the destruction of factories producing for the civilian 
market, let alone "pastoralization" a la Henry Morgenthau. As 
Decartelization Chief his main preoccupation wa~ merely to prevent 
his neighbor in OMGUS, _the Industrial Branch, from f.avoring (by 
means·of production authorizations, raw materials allocations, 
and the issuance of foreign exchange permits) the integrated 
.5 
combines at the expense of independent producers. 
such distinctions were,·. nonetheless, lost in the bitter feud 
waged over the proposed decartelization law in the months from 
August 1946 to February of the following year. Martin had become 
increasingly alarmed during the ea~ly months of occupation by 
. ' . 
numerous attempts on the part of officials in the Economic Divisions 
of the U.S. and British Military Governments, who were often 
prominent figures from the worlds of finance and industry, to restore 
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con_ditions of "business as usual" with their Ge·rma.n counterparts. 
His suspicions in this resi?ec't wer·e by no means unfounded~ for 
example,· _the head of the Economics Division in the ·British 
Military Government was Sir Percy Mills. Mills had last visited 
Germany on 16 March 1939 when, as a merriber of the delegation 
representing the Federation of B~itish ·industry, he s~gned a pact 
of friendship, the famous ·Dlisseldorf Agreement, _with Reichsgruppe 
Industrie. The latter was·the peak organization for business in 
the Third Reich. The Agreement c_alled for an international 
"division of influence, cooperation in joint ventures, and, in 
_ general, _the perpetuation of the practices of "organized capitalism" 
developed during the Depression years. 6 
Rather than permit officials like Mills to determine what 
constituted ;"excessive concentration" Martin proposed a 
decarteliza~ion law that would have mandated the Military Governments 
to require all German producers to demonstrate (with reference to 
fi_rm size, market share, Konzern affiliation, _cartel membership,. 
etc.) that they were not "excessively concentrated." Martin's 
boss., a Wall stre·et lawyer in General's uniform named William Draper, 
_while arguing privately ,that a so-called "rnandator,y _la.w" was-unnecce·sary 
because "the Germans are already on their backs," attempted to 
discredit the entire decartelization campa~gn publically. _ Through 
press leaks, .German reader.s were lead to believe that. anti-::-trust 
policies could be equated with Demontage, the destruction of the 
Verbundwirtschaft,-and the wilde:i;- visions of; a Mo~genthau. At 
the same time American readers were persuaded that OMGUS house'd 
dangerous radicals, possibly even Reds. Although Military Governor 
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Clay seems to have ha:r;-bored a. cer·tain amount of' sym]?a.thy for 
the antitrust a.J?proach and have ·held the brilliant and courageous 
young Martin in h;Lgh personal esteem, the outcome of; the dispute 
was never in serious doubt. U.S. Military Government Law 79 
of February 1947 and its British equivalent Law No. 78, adopted 
the "voluntary principle" as advocated by Draper. Martin had 
no choice but to r~s~gn_and in the following month was replaced 
by one Philips Hawkins. The new chief of the. D~cartelization 
Branch was Draper's son-in.-law and happened, .in addition,· to be 
a relative of the DuPonts of Delaware. They owned the chemical 
company of the same name, were the controlling shareholders of 
General Motors, _in fact the richest family in the United States. 
Soon thereafter Draper, invoking the ominous accusation of 
"disloyalty II fired the 120 remaining members of Martin's staff. 
From this point on, the reorganization of industry would be, with 
unimportant exceptions, a matter for the Germans to handle largely 
on their own. 7 
Past practices notwithstanding, _such a possibility should 
by no means have been dismissed out of hand, as was apparently 
done by the Decartelization Branch under Martin. Defeat hardened 
' r' 
the conviction of many Germans in" ••• the failure of the politico-
economic models __ of;'the 1930s, ". and thus there was, _according to 
a recent article by Henry Wallich, 11 . . .a readiness·to adopt new 
forms (and) as regards policy style a clear turning away from the 
capriciousness of the prewar.decade. 118 Germany's. new circumstances 
brought to the forefront within Ruhr management itself figures who, 
even during the 1930s, ha_d argued untiringly for the long-run 
-ll-
neces·sity. ot restoring price competitiveness, .it need: be by 
sacrifici~g both cartels-and ver"tica.l int~gration. -As H~go Stinnes. 
put the matter to ECA Administratox Hoffmann in a letter of 
22 July 1948, I'. . .only fundamental changes will be able to solve. 
the coal problem. The characteristic of Ruhr coal production in 
the past has been the existence of an economy of presence, whereas 
• o .success is dependent on the reintroduction·of an economy of 
efficiency." 9 In a formidable personal lobbying effort, _Stinnes 
took advantage of his American· citizenship to ensure that s·uch 
views as his gained a hearing from·occupation administrators. On 
the steel side, Heinrich Dinkelbach, former ·member of the Vorstand 
·of Vereinigte Stahlwerke held similar beliefs. He was of the 
opinion that the break up of his company (which controlled over 
45 percent of the_ German steel market) _was necessary, drafted a 
plan for splitting it up into components which would then be joined 
to complementary production units from other companies, a_nd as 
Treuhandverwalter---steel trustee---put into practice _what he 
had earlier pr~ached., 
Views such as Stinnes'-and activities such as Dinkelbach's 
were by no means accepted universally. Certain traditional family 
interests of Rhine and Ruhr, _in particular the Haniels, Klockners, 
and Wolffs (Thyssens, Flicks, and Krupps being temporarily 
sidelined), exerted whatever pressure could be brought to bear 
on the Anglo-Saxons in an effort to restore the industrial status 
quo ante belJ,.um. The main theme of _their propaganda, _which confused 
the functions of ownership and management, was that the seizure 








of A.ufsichtsra.te and reconstitution of Vo;r;-stande, hampered the 
effort to revive production. 10 But this campa,~gn was foolish 
and premature. ;The interests of the Ruhr we;i:;-e ·well-served by men 
such as Stinnes and Dinke],bach who directed their attention to 
clearing obstacles to ·coal production, .reviving the economic 
health of steel,· and,- _above all, avoidi!).g all discussion of 
"political" issues until the- Americans _founc;l it., necessary to call 
upon German conservatives to protect their land from socialism. 
The fact of the matter is that as a result of the collapse 
of the Third Reich Ruhr industrial assets had lost-all value and 
it could not have been restored without the support.of the 
occupation authorities. Physical damage aside, all firms were in 
fact bankrupt in ev~ry but the narrowest technical sense of 
the term. Inflation had eroded working capital to the point where 
liquidity was virtually -nonexistent. Foreign assets had been 
seized as payment for reparations. _Stocks were badly depleted, 
traditional domestic industrial markets drastically reduced, and 
foreign ones supplied mainly on the reparations account. But 
there were underlying problems in addition: the skewed price 
structures resulting from the complex of price controls and tariff 
and quota agreements of the 1930s and the secular trends affecting 
---·•" 
both coal ahd steel markets. Military Government administration 
of heavy industry was, in other words, essential for obvious reasons_ 
· of finance, supply, _and transportation, not to mention pol~tics. 
Moreover, _it offered certian distinct advantages, namely it would 
spare the traditional owners and managers the considerable political 
liabilities incumbent on readjusting to post-1945 conditions. One 
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of them of course was industrial demobilization--the' Demo·ntage 
actions that were the.concomitant of the shift .fr;-om war to peacetime 
conditions. Another was '' detrustif ication" ---the organizational 
dismantlement of the larg~, _inefficient production units of the 
interwar period. Finally, _there was the ma,tter of the 
"socialization of; losses.". E'or it was -abundantly clear that 
Ruhr industry could not expect to operate at a profit. Stinnes 
had a sound·appreciation of these facts, for he said with regard 
. . 
to coal "The question·of ownership ·canoe postponed for ye~rs, 
as the present economic state of the mines is neither covering 
the creditors nor the,shareholders and {is) resulting in 
· 11 subventions or .uneconomically high coal prices." Capitalist 
restoration in the Ruhr, _then, was a lengthy and complicated 
process involvi~g both the reorganization of business institutions 
and the creation of a'political environment both at home and abroad 
more receptive to the_ reintroduction of private German ownership 
than the continuation of public control in any form. It began 
with a kind of diplomatic victory over France in matters of- coal 
and steel policy~· 
"Coal supply,!' according to the author of The French in 
Germany, 1945-1949, "was a major factor ·in every decision that 
12 
France took with regard to Germany in the post-Liberation years." 
The dependence of the Lorraine steel industry on Ruhr coking coal 
was the immediate reason for this concern. But underlying it 
was a consider:ation 0,f far_ greater importance. German _defeat and 
_collapse offered France a one...;time opportunity to become the 








the 1946 Plan provided in particular for the modernization·and 
expansion of the Lorraine steel ·industry to the extent of raising 
raw steel capacity by 1950 to ·15 million annual tons, and outpU:t 
level about 50 percent above ·that of 1929. The critical corollary 
of this policy was the curtailment of future Ruhr steel production. 
Control over the-coal supply was to serve as the chief means to 
this end. 
Not surprisingly, it provided the central feature in all. 
French proposals for the solution of "the German question" durin\r 
the long tenure of Georges Bidault. With the exception of the 
month from mid-December 1946 to mid-January 1947, he was French 
Foreign Minister from Spring 1945 to July 1948. Bidault's main 
theme---strange echo of the Reich's wartime policies towards the 
defeated French---was to advocate the economic exploitation of 
, ' 
Germany for the benefit of her neighbors. The specific provisions 
of the many French proposals of these years i,ncluded, in addition to 
foreign priority of access to Ruhr coal, the administration of 
the steel- industry by a foreign trust, limits on output of the 
product, the creation of an international authority for the Ruhr 
and its political separation from Germany, French reoccupation of 
the Rhineland, French ownership of the Saar mines, _and de-centralization 
of German poli ti•cal structures. A national consensus grounded in 
recent unpleasant memories of German occupation underpinned these 
proposals. With the partial exception of the socialists, who 
advocated a policy of reconciliation based on a more genuine 
"internationalization" of the Ruhr and the eventual nationalization 




The ·sole aim of Anglo-American coal policy, as specified 
even in the otherwise restrictive 'March 1946 Levels..-of:...Industry 
agreement, .was to step up output in the general interests of 
European rec·oveiy. The task facing North German Coal Council, 
in other words, was to take whatever _measures were necessary 
towards this end. But if the British could count on the principled 
support of both the French and Americans they were not spared 
a good deal of criticism in practice~ The. former offered, on 
the basis of previous experience, to di~.:ect an international 
managerial cadre to run the mines. The Americans subjected the 
British to an annoying crossfire of complaint, accusations ·on the 
one hand of doing too little to "denazify" mine management and, 
on the other, not enough to raise outpu·to State bepartment 
delegate Walt W. Rostow, who inspected Ruhr operations in May 1946, 
expressed the prevalent view that "The British are doing a very 
bad job ••• and no good purpose is likely to be served by not 
k . th . . d . 1 · h . ,; 
14 
ma 1ng is JU gment c ear tot em. He recommended increasing 
the operational authority of German mine managers. 
It is nonetheless important notto overlook the accomplishments 
of the first twenty months of the occupation. In the first quarter 
of 1945, coal output, previously in excess of 400,000 tons per 
day, _had fallen __ to about 30,Q00. Ten percent of production capacity 
had been destroyed and another 25 percent presented serious problems 
o~ reconstruction or repair, The mine labor force, _normally 
40Qt·Q_00( .ha.d fallen to less than 100 1 0,00. Damage to miner housi!lg 
was particularly extensive: of 250,000 dwelli!lg units, _some 66,000 
were completely destroyed and another 130,000, severely damaged. 
Transport and industrial activity was at a near standstill. 
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Miner recruitment was the primary objective of recovery 
policy. The British relea:sed from POW camps some 35,000 miners, 
all available German labor was. directed to the mines, .and training 
programs were set up on an emergency basis. Thanks.to such 
measures the labor fore~ increased by 100,000 men by the end of 
,•• 
the year. By mid-1946 some 95,000 buildings had b~en repaired. 
For reasons of morale as well as physical health, rations were 
increased substantially, indeed to above pre-1945 levels. After 
October 1946, 4000 calories a day was the norm •. Labor relation~ 
also received careful attention. Control Council Law No. 22 
authorized the set up of Works Councils, the miners' union was 
reorganized, .and prewar social insurance schemes restored. Such 
reforms would prove to be enduring. Where possible, NGCC also 
promoted mine mechanization·. Although American machinery proved 
to be ill-adapted to Ruhr geological conditions, progress was 
made in introducing both the "coal plough" and the German-developed 
cutter-loader. Although in the experimental stage at the time of 
German capitulation, some thirty machines were in use by the end 
of 1946 and another 23 on order. Finally, the supply situation 
at the mines was improved, although increases beyond the levels 
of late '1946 would require the stimulation of recovery in the 
manufacturing industry. These levels, some 180,000 daily tons 
(up from 60,Q00 tons in June 1945) represent an impressive 
achievement. Further improvements would depend on events outside 
the coal s~ctor proper. 15 
The revival o·f Ruhr coal production put the issue of its 
supply-and distribution at the top of the diplomatic agenda. The 
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French effort· to control it, _however, _encountered a succession 
of setbacks that more or less paralleled the eclipse of the 
reform element in OMGUS. The July 1945 coal directive of. 
President Truman, _the ·initial policy guideline, _assigned priority 
to exports which, during the remainder of 1945 were to occur at 
the annual rate of 10,000,000 tons, then rise to 15,000,000 during 
the first quarter of 1946. These targets were never reached, in 
part because overall output did not rise. rapidly as expected.· 
But the larger part of the export shortfall of 1946 resulted from 
the exceptionally high "self-consumption" requirements of the 
mines. This was due to the existence of an open scandal, an -
understandable one under the circumstances.· German supervisors, 
in short, tolerated on a large scale both organized and individual 
pilferage from stocks. Thanks to such practices, coal production 
for German use increased from approximately 1,750,000 tons in 
July 1945 to 3,750,000 tons in December of that year. At the same 
time, however, France (as of April 1946)_ was able to derive only 
330,000 tons per month from Germany of total coal imports of 
800,000 tons per month, and total import requirements based on 
the low operating levels of 1938 of 1,800,000 tons. To aggravate 
the French coal situation, it was impossible to increase imports 
from Britain, which was itself suffering from severe .bottlenecks 
because of shortages, or from the United States because of both 
.the high costs due to the distances involved and the_ general Dollar 
16 
sho;i;-tage. 
Until February 1947, ~ranee had far less difficulty in gaining 
U.S. and British commitments to the principle of export priority 
-18-
with r~gard to coal deliveries than in securing the actual 
commodity. A State Department statement of 22 March 1946 reemphasized 
."the overridi!}CJ obligation to export 18,000,000 tons of coal 
.to the Western liberated countries in the last nine months of 
1946, 11 . adding that' "Any increase in the consumption of coal within 
Germany should be conditioned absolutely on the satisfaction of 
these export quotas." A joint statement of 23 May 1946 by 
Presidents Truman and Goiun fuzzed over the issue only ever so 
.slightly. It noted that France's import requirements of 1,8.00,l)OO 
tons per month would increase to 2,500,000 by the end of the pe~_·iod 
contemplated by the Plan and that Germany must supply at least 
two_-thirds of· the total. 17 Indirectly, however, the remark conceded 
Germany's claim to increase total tonnages for domestic consumption. 
Events would nonetheless prove such estimates of future export 
allocations to be wildly optimistic •. Total Ruhr exports in 1946 
amounted to 10 million tons and this figure slipped to 9.5 million 
tons the following year due to a transportation breakdown. At 
the same time, however, total output increased from 53.5 million 
tons to .71.1 million tons,· the balance being consumed domestically. 
But for the French worse was yet to come. At.the Moscow 
Foreign Ministers ,conference of March and April 1947, the Anglo-
Saxons broke with the policy of assigning priority to exports, 
replacing it with the so-called slidi!l,g scale. It gave first 
.claim to German requirements, increasing exports from 21 to 25 
percent o~ total output as the 'daily rate rose from 28·0, 000 tons 
to 370,000 tons. At the higher figure, the· ratio between domestic 
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and foreign sales of coal was just about wher·e it had been in 
the last year of comparable ·operating levels, .1932. 18 
·The French encountered similar frustrations with regard to 
steel issues. The slow recovery of the Ruhr industry postponed 
the confrontation between recovery and reform. In any case, 
Ruhr raw steel outputs in 1946 and 1947 (2.6 million tons and 
2.9 million tons respectively) remained .far below even the 5.8 
million annual tons authorized by the March 1946 Levels-of~Industry 
agreement, not to mention the 10.7 million of its August 1947 
revision. This rate of recovery actually fell below that for any 
other major industrial sector. It can.be attributed most directly, 
as Abelshauser points out, ~o the shortage of ores, particularly 
of the high grade Swedish type, but also both to the low priority 
of the indu,stry in Allied recovery policy and the availability 
of sufficient stocks of semi-finished steel products to permit 
manufacturing to take place at the actual low levels of activity.· 
It would~ in other words, have been still possible in Spring 1947 
-to reduce Ruhr steel making capacity in a significant way without 
interfering with the production process. 15 
Circumstances should have·been propitious, for the so-called 
Transfer Plan which Bidault proposed at the Moscow Foreign 
Minister's Conference in March 19470 Its main feature was a 
kind of one-sided Franco-Ruhl;" partnership hin9in<.J on the 
non-resumption of activity at the foundries of the r~gion. Instead, 
. . 
Ruhr rolling mills would receive the 5 million annual tons of 
new French raw steel to be produced under the Plan in exchange 
for exports of coking coal to Lorraine. The Bidault 
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propos.al would_ have ·entailed ver·y heavy costs for the Ruhr. It 
would require railroad· wagons and barges car~ying coke to France 
to return empty. · In addition, _blast furnace gas and coking gas 
could not have been delivered to the Ruhrgas pipeline network---
a loss of two-thirds of its total supply •. Furthermore, new 
sources of gas would have to be found to supply the rolling mills 
to be put into operation under the proposal. And they would also 
require an additional 1.5 billion Kwh of electricity, which 
previously would have been generated on-site from surplus blast 
. . 
furnace gas. In the face of such objections, the Transfer.Plan 
could not get a serious hearing from the Foreign Ministers. Indeed 
the increase in Ruhr steel output soon became a priority matter 
fbr the Anglo-Saxons. 20 As for the French government, rejection 
of the Transfer Plan left it with no policy except, as Monnet 
put it, "to fight a rearguard action against Germany's inevitable 
rehabilitation. 1121 
The rising American fear of communism was the consideration 
most·directly responsible for the restoration of Ruhr industry 
to private control. The events of. the winter of 1946-1947 transformed· 
what had up to then been merely one of the several· OMGUS policy 
concerns into a virtual obsession. The frost came with exceptional 
harshness, causing severe and unexpected setbacks iri the recovery 
process~~~indeed reopeni~g prospect~ of revolution and chaos. It 
also brought into focus u.s.· fr_ustrations with French and British 
policy t?wards Germany and seemed to provide evidence that only 
Germans were able to manage their own economy properly. There 
is, .in- short,. _no mistaking the new .tone in American policy. .Where 
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previously the u.s. had attempted to achieve ·consensus with the· 
Allies in matters German, it now so~ght aggresively, while still 
preserving the appearance of unity, _to impose its own priorities. 
And first among them was that there should be no socialism, not 
to mention communism, _in any future West German state. The SPD, 
at the time commi ted to nationalizing i_ndustry, had, in short, 
at all costs to be kept out of ·power. Two years of intense, 
behind-the~scenes brow-beating of the British Labor Government 
were required to bring about this resuL:. The French were merely 
ignored. The issue of public versus pr~_vate ownership, first 
broached in coal, was decided as a result of i.ntervention·s at 
the nationai level of West German_ policy. 
coal would provide both an early test of Bizonal cooperation 
and a preview of the eventual Ruhr settlement. The harsh winter, 
which created shortages of the commodity throughout the economy, 
brought the mines to the forefront of Allied concerns. The 
British agreed with the U.S. that to ra.:j..se outputs the authority 
of German management had to be increa·sed. Discussions over how 
best,to do this, however, soon brought into the clear light of 
day Anglo-American differences over the issue of property disposition, 
HM Government insisting on eventual nationalization and the U.S. 
seeking to block it by a deferral of the question. The matter 
came up repeatedly at the "Anglo-:-A.merican Conversations Regarding 
German coal· Production II which were coriduct.ed through the summer 
months of 1947, and whose immediate purpose was to fit the coal 
organizations set up by the British into the Bizonal framework. 22 
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The terms eventually arrived at ;f;avored the U.S. First, strong 
new German exec·utive ·arm, . called simply "German Coal Man~gement," 
replaced DKBL. ·Anew US/UK Control Group, a supervisory body, 
replaced the British-run North German Coal Council (NGCC). 
Significantly, however, _the U.S. delegate to it was vested with 
a power to veto any measures tending towards the delegation of 
ownership to a public _body. More important than the U.S. vote, 
however, was the fact that the new "German Coal Management" was. 
so organized as to increase the already preponderant influence·· 
of the managerial element in the German executive arm. Of its 
six divisions, only two, welfare, and housing,. were headed· by 
representatives of labor; those from the old mining companies 
he~ded the ones for production, distribution, supply, and procurement 
11 f - t' d t t· t· 23 as we as - or accoun 1ng an s a is 1cs. The delegation of 
control powers from Bizonal authority to such a body would, 
in other words, be nearly tantamount to the restoration, in some 
form or other, of private control. 
.. 
The de facto domination of the management element within 
the German executive arms, of steel as well as coal, ._did little,. 
however, to calm the increasingly obsessive U.S. fears of 
communism in the Ruhr. The onsettir1g hysteria is, for instance, 
evident in the tone of the dispatches sent from the U.S. counsel 
General in Bremen, _whose responsibilities included reporting on 
events from the r~gion. He wa:i;-ned repeatedly and with tir.esome 
insistence that the Labor Government was actively conspiring with 
the_ union representatives at DKBL and the Treuhandverwaltung 
, 








insta,rice, _he reported tha,t 
"The ·sepa.ration action ha,s taken a course which 
unmistakably turns from priva.te economy to socialization, 
The ·originators of the sepa.ration action have 
. grown up in the industr_ial bureaucracy, _at the 
desks and in the statistical offices of the old 
concerns. This bureaucracy now abandons private 
economy and concluded a new pact with the labor 
union bureaucracy since it apparently sees the 
handwriting on the wall. The result is that 
private economy is d_eprived of another key position 
as the "Treuhandverwaltung" determinedly utilizes 
the power created by the occupation and,·although 
lacking any legal basis for it, i~ effecting a 
"cold socialization." · 
The initiative for socializing the German iron 
industry runs parallel to the,British-domestic plans 
for ·:.he collectivization of industry and obviously 
origj_nates in the. ideology of the British Labor 
·Party. It has developed many steps in advance of 
British socialization, in Germany at least, and 
seems already to have gone beyond the bounds of the 
law •••• The introduction of bolshevist economic 
ideas (is) thus made easy and it is not accidental 
that, despite Communist press criticism of the 
Treuhandverwaltung, Communist representatives of 
the labor.unions collaborate with the Treuhandverwaltung., 
exhorting labor in these enterprises in favor of 
separation. 11 24 
Such concerns were behind the intervention ·that settled 
the issue of private versus public control in the Ruhr. It 
involved a deal between the U.S. and the U.K. concerning the terms 
of the restoration of political control to Germany. For the 
British, it meant the abandonment of any plans for nationalization 
in the Ruhr. In short, the U.K., in exchange for American 
assumption of an increased percentage of the occupation costs, 
al_lowed the U.S. to "pack'' with conservatives the German 
organization which, it had been· ~greed, would. take over responsibility 
for directing the economy.· This organization was the Executive 
Committe (of Bizonia) which in Spring 1947 was appointed by a 
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52-.member Economic Council elected, for its part, by. the Landtage. 
The problem, .from the u. S. standpoint, was that the SPD had a 
majority on the Com..~ittee and it was headed by Dr. Viktor Agartz, 
a Marxist. To_ get around this situation, OMGUS, having bo~ght 
off Britis_h objections, changed the rules. _ The Councii, which 
elected the Executive Committee, wa~ e~larged to 104 members 
with the predictable results that in January 1948, when the 
matter again -came up for a vote, the CDU/CSU had a majority and 
Dr. Puender of the CDU replaced Dr. Agartz ~s Chairman. The 
"new team" headed by Puender, then, could _be counted on to manag_e 
correctly, at least from th~ U.S. point of view, the proces~·of 
transferring the industries under custodianship to German control. 1125 
These arrangements were worked out under the terms of "Law 
-No. 75: _Reorganization. of the .German Iron and Steel Industries" 
enacted 10 November 1948. It provided for the transition to 
German control and sanctioned, indeed lent permanence, to the 
"neo capitalist" restoration.already underway in Ruhr industry. 
The new iaw stipulated the transfer of ownership from the U.S./U.K. 
Control-Group to the shareholders of new, independent coal.and 
steel enterprises, and delegated the responsibility for reorganization 
to successor organizations of the German executive arms which had 
managed the two---industr:l..es since 1946. 26- puender' s. appo.1ntments 
to the New German Coal.M.ini!lg Board and the German Steel Trustee 
_Association insured that continuity would be preserved. Heinrich 
Kost, Director of the Rhei•nischwestfalischeskohlensyndikat (RWKS) , 
became the new head of the new German Coal Mining Board. -Of equal 
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importance, .Dr. Helmut Vits, .Director General of Vereinigte 
Glanzstofffa.brikeri AG and a lo?g-time advisor to NGCC was named 
chief of the Advisory Committee on the reorganization of the 
industry. The other members of this body included two representatives 
of the former companies, two man~gers from DKBL, a financial 
expert and member of the Aufsichstrat of Vereinigte Glanzstoff, 
- a certified accountant· but only one representative of the 
Federation of Tra.de 'Qnions (DGB). The coal Mining Trade Union 
prot~sted bitterly its virtual exclusion from the work of Vi ts'·· 
committee, indeed" ••• found it intolerable that all basic {coal) 
questions are being handled in an obscure atmosphere and that 
the public and the workers involved are not sufficiently informed, 
let alone allowed to participate. 1127 
Dr. Puender's nominations of January 1949 to the German Steel 
Trustee Association were similarly weighted in favor of business 
_ interests. Of seventeen candidates, only one had been a union 
official, and only two oth~rs, both ·accountants, had had union 
associations. The rest represented financial and industrial 
interests, _and included Herman Abs of the Deutsche Bank, the 
Director of the Business Association for Iron and steel, Dr. Guenter 
Henle (a manager at Kloeckner), Guenther Sohl {a Krupp Manager). 
Heinrich Dinkelba~h was, predictably, _appointed as Director of 
·the new organization. such appointments, then, _assured eventual 
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resumption of private control over Ruhr industry. What remained 
to be worked out concerned the details of the restoration: the 
number of new coal and steel companies to be created; their 
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relationship to manufacturing, _energy affiliates; and marketing 
' . ' . 
organization; terms of compensation for ·former owners; subsidy 
and prici!3-g matters, _labor policy, _and, of course, the relationships 
of the reorganized coal and steel companies to the rest of 
Europe~ 
Here there was· less a shortage of ideas than viable solutions. 
Indeed public interest in political and economic problem-solving 
on a European scale was never greater than in the roughly two 
years that followed·the announcement of the Marshall Plan. At 
the same time, actual progress towards European integration was 
often disappointingly slow. The Council of Europe was a "talk 
shop." OEEC was unable to coordinate national economic policies 
and had had only limited success in reducing quota agreements. 
Only the European Payments Union seemed able to make real gains 
towards the liberalization of international trade. In addition, 
much of the discussion concerning European industrial policy 
shaded off into -the utopian. The political bases were lacking 
for the integration of European industry on a socialist basis as 
advocated at the Westminister Conference by figures such as 
Andre Philip and Barbara ward, not·least of all because the 
British Labor Government was fundamentally disinterested in 
such projects. 2 9--- --- · 
The U.S. Government was no less short on solutions, particularly 
with r~ga:I;"d to The Ruhr Problem. A.gain, _however, _the problem was 
less one of ideas than of their implementation. As early as 
May 1946 Military Governor Clay suggested that to reconcile.private 
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German ownership of Ru,hr properties and international control 
l 
that a two-tiered appr,oach be adopted. It would involve the 
issuance of Class A Coµunon Stock in Ruhr companies to German · 
owners, and a Special ~referred Class B Stock, with overriding 
voting powers, to the i:"epresentatives of the, Allied as well as 
the restored German governments. The latter would together 
comprise a Ruhr Control Authority, with the power to establish 
·production levels, control exports, etc. In June 1947 John J. 
McCloy, _then Pr·'.:!sident of the World Bank and subsequently Allied 
High Commissioner for Germany, proposed a massive loan, which 
his organization was prepared to underwrite, to finance a crash 
program of industrial modernization in the. Ruhr undert.aken for 
the general benefit of.Europe. He believed that it would provide 
the necessary cement to bond together interests as diverse as 
those to be represented on Clay's Ruhr Control Authority. In 
a personal letter of 7·July 1947 to Under;Secretary of State 
Robert Lovett, he emphasized that "Too many people_look upon 
Ruhr coal merely as a reparations good and not as the necessary 
base for the whole Eurbpean economy. If all the peripheral 
countries had a stake '(in the Ruhr project) as they do in the 
World Bank it might tend to create the proper attitude. . . . 
Building strip mills or even road and transportation systems 
throughout Europe is just so much unrelated effort until we have 
the basic economy which, _both in E!l,gla,nd and Europe, is coal.. • • 
I have (therefore) felt that all of the agencies available for 
the restoration and rehabilitation of international trade should 
.be directed to the sol~tion of this fundamental problem~" 3 o 
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The Inte:r;-national Ruhr Autho~ity (IRA) was intended to 
provide the capstone of U.S. policy towards German coal and 
steel and the vehicle through which hopes such as those of Mccloy 
were to be realized. Established in April 1949 after negotiations 
lasting for more than a year, _it set up the machinery for joint 
Four Power-German direction of the region's industries. The new 
IRA was empowered spectfically to set production levels, determine 
allocations for the domestic ahd foreign markets, and, in general 
supervise operations. In fact the organization never had more 
than a shadow existence, merely performing nominally the functions 
of various Trizonal coal agencies. It r.0flected the divisions 
that had plagued Allied policy from the first and, _added to them, 
came new German objections. The French National Assembly, first 
of all, assented to the International Agreement on the Ruhr only 
with the qualification that the industries of the area eventually 
be transferred to international ownership. Moreover, six months 
before the IRA had actually begun operations, the Ministers-
President of the various Landtage threatened to withhold their 
support 1,mless, as seemed an impossibility, its authority were 
extended to cover western Europe as a whole. The IRA was, in 
short, a dead letter and therewith American initiatives for the 
solution of the _J~u,hr question came to an end. 31 
The new beg-innings towa;r;-ds one, _coming as they did from the 
German side, _were necessarily tentative. In the first _week of 
November. 1947, _Dr. Robert Pferdme!lges, _member of the Finance 
Committee of the Executive Board, fina_ncial advisor and close 
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personal friend of Konrad Adenauer, and director of a private 
Cologne bank approached the Comite des Forges through the 
intermediation 0£ the De Wendel Family anC\, apparently, Alois 
Meyer (the Director of ARBED) in order to make an astonishing 
offer. It was to cede, _as an act of_ goodwill, a fifty perceht 
share of Ruhr iron and steel to French industry. Pferdmenges, 
it was established, acted as a result of decisions arrived at 
an earlier meeting, which was attended by, among others, Dr. Hermann 
Reusch of GHH, Dr. Hermann Wenzel of Vesta, _Dr o Karl Jarres of 
Kloeckner, and Johannes Semler, former director of the Bizonal 
Economic Administration. It must therefore be assumed that he 
acted on their behalf. He subsequently claimed to have also act:ed 
with the specific approval of Heinrich Kost, _General Director of 
the German coal Mining Management. The French, as it turns out, 
begged off entering negotiations on grounds of domestic political 
instability and from fear of being branded as collaborators. Still, 
there was apparently mutual agreement during the discussions on 
the need for a Frg.nco-German "political solution" (politische 
Losung). 32 
The U.S. State Department was·both concerned and somewhat 
perplexed about the purpose of the Pferdmenges mission. The 
Counsel General in Bremen concluded that the banker was acting as 
an agent of Adenauer and in pursuit of a traditional Rhenish policy 
towards France. Noting Adenauer's recent 1.·emarks about the 
necessity of overcoming the French "security psychosis" stemming 
from the power of the Ruhr, _the ·counsel General cited two previous 
attempts to arrive at industrial agreements with which Adenauer 








the brown coal magnate. Dr. Silverberg in 1925, the second, .the 
1932 effort by Cha_ncellor Bruning to reach"7 a coal-:-steel agreemenf---
the latter incidentally also a part of the attempt to take ·over 
Vereinigte Stahlwerke, .. engineered by the steelman-turned-,Ambassador-
to-:-Berlin Francois--Pon9et. · Hugo Stinnes Jr., .who was not represented 
. , 
at· the industrialists~. get-together preceeding the dispatch of 
the Pferdmenges mission, informed State that it amounted to merely 
another in Adenauer's many·attempts to detach Rhine and·Ruhr from 
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the rest of Germany. 
Pferdmenges in fact approached the French in pursuit of a 
traditional Ruhr policy. Appearances and certain public -impressions 
to the contrary notwithstanding, relations between the industrialists 
of the Ruhr and the steel-producing regions of Eastern France 
were astonishingly solid. They were built on a succession of 
successful attempts to overcome the vicissitudes of both politics 
and international coal and steel markets, the end result of which 
was that, in mariy respects, the heavy industrialists of the 
two regions had learned to function, in many respects, as a single 
unit. If this fact was not well known, .it is because the political 
risks of admitting it openly were normally considerable. Concealment 
from public view was, in other words, necessary for the conduct of 
business under conditions of political conflict, war, .and occupation. 
on the other hand, _eventual Franco-German political reconcili,.ation 
· would eliminate much of the need to operate in secret, .indeed would 
make it possible for the heavy industry of Western Europe to draw 
more effectively-and exterisivelyon the powers of state in dealing 










Even a. brief outline ·o~ the history of producer agreements 
in West European heavy industry during the ·1ate--1920s, _193 Os 
. • I ,., 
and during World War II should indicate how, _in fact, they 
provided the building blocks upon which was built the European 
Coal and Steel Community. Here one must describe a record of 
accomplishment, at the same time remembering, however, that the 
historical prociess it~elf w~s extremely complicated and outcomes were 
never a certainty. The first Internat;ional Steel Cartel (IRG)* 
was set up by French and German producers, (with those of Belgiurr 
and Luxemburg in supporting roles) in an attempt to overcome the. 
problems arising from the excess raw steel capacity in western 
Europe. Welcomed by Stresemann and Briand as opening the way 
to the_federalization of Europe, the IRG collapsed in 1931 as 
a result of the shrinkage of international markets caused by the 
Depression but not, however, without having worked well enough 
to be considered worth reviving by the itidustrialists of the various 
Western European districts. 35 
International heavy industry cartels, _still dominated by 
•· 
the producers of Western Europe, were a permanent and significant 
.feature.of the economic life of the 1930s. This fact is traceable 
in part to the adoption in France and Belgium and, to the extent 
applicable, _in ~µxemburg and the Netherlands, _of German organizational 
models in both the coal and steel industries. Great Britain should 
be added to the list as well, _thus making her el;igible for the 
.first time to affiliate with the Western-European-:-dominated 
associations.· strong Ruhr-like producer associations,and,nat.ional 








industry--:--:--:-these characteristics of "organized ca.pitalism'' on 
the German model--..:.made possible in the western Europe and Britain 
,., 
of the 1930s .the :t;"egulation of domestic markets and enforcement 
of pricing agreements, planning_ of investments, _coqr<iH~a,t±on of 
transport and tax policy, .establishment· of common policies in 
wage matters, and coordination of exports with sales on the domestic 
35 markets. The second reason behind the strength of international 
heavy industry cartels during the 1930s was the combination of 
tariff barri~rs and illiquidity, or put another way, the perceived 
need to regulate international trade and :payments by means of 
bilateral quotas. Industrial associations had an indespensable 
role in determining what could or should be either exported or 
allowed to enter the country. International cartels and bilateral 
trade agreements were thus interwoven in a most complex way 
determined jointly by governments and producers. While the 
demarkation of authority between the two was never clear, it is 
apparent that the close interpenetration of public and private 
spheres made it possible, first, for industry to influence national 
trade policy to a substantial degree and, second, to rely more 
heavily on the state in enforcing private agre·ements among producers. 
It is also clear that because of the severe political and economic 
problems of Depi:ession · Europe, _not to mention the cumbersomeness 
of the economic regulatory machinery, .the -prevailing methoc;ls 
could work to the full satisfactton of no one. 
The t:t;"adition of cooperation in Western European heavy 
industry advanced in two significant particulars during the 193 Os. 
First, _,the International Steel Cartel, while remaining essentially 
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a joint enterprise of the German, French, .and Benelux "founder-
members, ". did effectively succeed in contrplling international 
markets in the producte Of equal importance, it also managed 
to find satisfactory solutions to the various political crises 
of the late-1930s. One indication of the growth in IRG's po.,;rer 
was the steady increase in its membership. In 1935 and 1936 the 
producers of Czecposlovakia, Hungary, .and Poland joined, comprising 
the so-called "Central European Group." They were, however, never 
more than a minor faction in the overall politics of the cartel. 
On 30 April 1935 British producers became associates rather than 
full members of IRG, the distinction being due in good measure to 
the United Kingdom's.greater importance as a steel ~arket for 
Continental products than as an international competitor. Finally, 
in November 1937 the four largest American steel producers, 
represented by the Steel Export Association of the -United States, 
affiliated with the Europeans and the British, antitrust laws 
presenting a barrier to full membership in international cartels. 
Among major steel exporters, only Sweden and Japan remained formally 
i 
outside IRG. By 1938, it controlled over 85 percent of international 
steel exports. The steel cartel in fact succeeded both in 
maintaining a high steady price level and in frustrating attempts 
in_several countries to build foundries and rolling mills. 36 
German expansionism, which poisoned the diplomatic atmosphere 
and eventually led to wa.r, .actually proved a bqon to the IRG. · It 
put Ruhr steel---then producing at full tilt for a domestic market 
facing production bottlenecks· due to shortages of- the product---
in the ··enviable position of bei~g able to bestow large export 
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quotas from areas bought into the German customs zone ·(Austria, 
Sudentenland, .and Resttscheckai) on their order:--starved counterparts 
in France, Belgium, Luxemburg, .and the Netherlands. This· fact, 
then, provides an important pa.rt of the background both to the 
diplomacy of Economic Appeasement and to the events of the occupation 
period. 37 
The second accomplishment of the 1930s in connection with 
the eventual formation of the European Coal and Steel Community 
· concerned the combustible. Franco-German coal-steel problems 
were in fact much less tractible than steel-steel. This was 
less the fault of producers, however, than governments. The 
Ruhr normally disposed of large surplusses of coking coal which 
because of high transportation costs could only be sold nearby---
that is, in effect, to the steel producing districts of Western 
Europe. It probably need not be heavily underscored that one 
reason for Ruhr solicitousness with regard to the foundrymen of 
France (not to mention Belgium and Luxemburg) was precisely their 
vital importance as purchasers of coking coal. For the governments 
concerned, however, the combustible was a potential diplomatic 
and military weapon, and it was also in this light that Ruhr coal-
Lorraine steel issues were presented to the publics of the two 
nations. J?oli_~.ical rhetoric aside, international payments problems, 
·especially German shortages of foreign exchange,. govern~d the 
coal tra~fic between France and Germany during the 1930s and are 
at the bottom responsible both for the accomplishments and 
. . . 38 
shortcomi~gs in respect to it. 
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The problem, _briefly stated, was that while france depended 
on Ruhr coal, its_ government assigned prio,Fity to creditor- over 
export interests. -German trade balances thus could not be used 
to finance a corresponding amount of French exports to the Reich. 
(For understandable reasons, _the French were also unwilling to 
accept as payment the overvalued RM.) This situation gave rise 
to what Pierre Mend~s-France termed "L'6quilibre par les bas," 
an incessant racheting downwards of bilateral trade between the 
two countries. 39 It reached the point at which in 1936 coal was 
virtually the only good passing through the Franco-German horde~. 
A significant attempt was made to solve this problem-in early 
1937, one brought about by a French decision to step up coal 
stocks as a rearmament measure. It featured the conclusion of 
a new Franco-German trade agreement. Its most important provision 
called for the increase in German coke deliver_ies from 116,000 
tons per month to 275,QOO tons per month. It stipulated as well 
that "The French have agreed to fil-1 all of the:i.r coke import 
requirements from Germany." 40 Reichsbankprasident Schacht, in 
the first German ministerial visit·to France since the Machter-
. greifung, signed the trade agreement on 10 July 1937 at the 
occasion of the opening of the Paris World's Fair. As was the 
· case with the founding of the IRG in 1926, _it was heralded as 
the opening of a new era in Franco~German relations. And even 
. though the results of the new deal were disapJ?ointi!lg, again because 
of payments problems, the hope born with it remained alive---
soII\ething which, _to be sur;e, _pr:esupposes a strong willingness on 
the French part, to suspend disbelief. 
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In the months between the 15 September 1938 Munich Conference 
and the 15 Ma:r:-ch 1939 German March on Prague, .the Government of 
,,., 
France; .simultaneously with Great Britain, _made significant 
.overtures towards the conclusion of pacts between their businessmen 
and those of the Reich which, essentially, grew out of the strong 
international relationships built up in coal and steel during 
'·, 
the 1930s. As war approached they were, indeed one of the few 
remaining touchstones of "Economic Appeasement." Apart from 
obvious political disagreements, trade between the Reich and 
Britain, as well as with France, had broken down as a result 
of the Depression except, by and large, in coal. Moreover, steol 
provided one of the rare international forums in which international 
problems were actually being solved to the satisfaction of French 
and British interests. These considerations are what, then, led 
to the French proposals of 7 December 1938. 41 They included, first, 
an increase in Franco-German trade and, second, the formation of 
joint ventures by the businessmen of the two nations in the French 
Empire, in Latin America, the Balkans, and Africa. The French 
,. 
delegate also proposed the establishment of a binational consortium 
to rebuild the industry and-"infrastructures" of Franco Spain. 
While these plans did not, because of general German disinterest, 
. get beyond the organizatio.n in February 193 9 of a "Centre 
Economique J:ranco-Allemande" British efforts at "~conomic Appeasement" 
were· somewhat more successfui. They resulted in the signing of 
the Dilsseldorf Agreement of 16- March 1939, This·pact, which 
came at the conclusion of successful Anglo-Ge:i;man coal talks, called 
specifically for forming bilateral cartels in every branch of 
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industry, and, .in general, .a kind o;f; wo:i:ld economic partnership. 
based on the existence of common approache-s to doi~g business on 
a basis of "organized capitalism.n42 
German· occupation after May 1940 would provide significant 
practical experience in this regard, not for the British, as 
fate would have it, but for the French, Belgians, Luxemburgers, 
and Dutch. During the occupation, the industrialists of the 
Western European coal and steel districts entered a kind of 
unspoken survival pact premised on economic collaboration. Nazi 
rule was not i.1 fact popular in the Ruhr, which is, however, 
hardly to say that the coal operators and foundrymen were prepared 
to block Hitler's designs. Indeed, in order to gain a measure 
of protection, industry became his instrument. "Industrial self-
administration" (industrieller Selbstverwaltung)--_;the name attached 
to the economic management approach adopted during the Third Reich---
meant, in effect, that business ran the war economy for the regime. 
With the onset of occupation rule in France and the Benelux nations 
it therefore also took over the responsibility for managing the 
industry of the so ... called Occupied Western Area consistent·.with 
requirements of the war effort.44 
The industrialists of France and the Benelux nations had not 
asked to be invaded by the Wehrmacht, _nor were they likely to be 
· reconciled to the prospect of long-run German domination. But 
they too were unwilling to resist Hitler, _indeed preferred 
cooperation in the New Order so long as their interests were, at 
least to some extent, res·pected. Such facts as the territorial 
dismemberment of France, the annexation of Luxemburg, a.nd racialism 
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in the ·Reichskoi:nissariat Nie-ae·rlande, _to be sure, subjected to 
_ great strains any willingness to collaborate. Such political 
,.., 
threats added, however, to the importance of the Ruhr as•·schutzherr. 
The fate of the coal and steel industries of .occupied Western 
Europe was not a happy one. They operated at huge iosses, were 
not modernized, indeed in the case of coal allowed to get badly 
run down. Thanks in good measure to support of the Ruhr, however, 
the worst was avoided. There was no wholescale expropriation of 
assets, significant dismantlement of plant, or deliberate financ-Lal 
exploitation. It is perhaps for such reasons that the coal and 
steel industrialists of occupied Western Europe provided so little 
in the way of damaging evidence at either the "Flick" or the 
"Roechling" prosecutions after the war. It is in fact evident 
in retrospect that in various ways· German rule in Western Euiope 
even advanced somewhat the process of economic integration: 
common institutions were set up for the allocation of raw materials, 
organizational structures were further "harmonized,11 financial 
"communities of interest" came into being, and "Eurovisionaries" 
in both the occupied countries and ·:the Reich had the opportunity 
to bruit plans for future joint undertakings and amalgamations~
44 
The political realities of the war's aftermath obscured these 
facts. Although the Dutch and Luxemburgers at times lobbied 
vigorously for what amounted to the restoration of the traditional 
economic role of the Ruhr, _French foundrymen were obviously not 
in aposition to contravene the official policy of their own 
government, _least .of all considering that the expansion of the 
steel industry figured so large in its plans. 45 All this changed, 
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however, once Ruhr-steel's recovery to pre_.war output levels had 
come to be recognized as inevitable, for it would open up the 
' ' ~ 
old problems of coal supply to. Lorraine and of excess capacity 
in the West European foundries. This fact should have registered 
in ·when the ECA targeted its output at 
It did so, however, only in Spring 1949, as it became increasingly 
evident that IRA could not work and that the Anglo-Americans 
were intent on relinquishing power to the Federal Republic as 
soon as possible. 
The appointment of Puender's slate of Steel Trustees provided 
the necessary cue for the resumption of negotiations toward some 
sort of restored International Steel Cartel. On 15 March 1949 
the U.S. Counsel General in Bremen reported that "Rumors abound, 
and much significance is read into the activities of such officials 
as the French Ambassador, Francois Pon5et, who is reported to 
have had recent discussions with Dr. Hermann Reusch, Managing 
Director of Gutehoffnungshiltte ..• and a leading spokesman for 
the iron and steel industry. Reusch is likewise reported to have 
recently been in Paris, presumably to discuss with French officials 
the organization of the Ruhr industry. 1146 By summer, European 
foundrymen were reported by Andre Philip to be taking tea together 
suspiciously often. Something important was clearly in the works. 47 
Simultaneously, _the experts o~ the French Plan, .under the 
direction of Jean ?,1onnet, _began the draft of the blueprint whose 
outlines were revealed in Schum~nn's. proposal and whose details 
were filled in during the organizational conferences for the ECSC 
which-met in the months from June 1950 to July 1952. Monnet's 
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document represented less an alternative to a new International 
Steel Cartel than an extension of it. Planning of investment 
~ . 
and production, _coordination of sales, standardization of product, 
price compensation, encouragement of rationalization, joint 
exporting---these.functions which the proposed High Authority. 
was to carry out with the cooperation o~ producer associations 
dealt with matters long familiar to them·. What was new about the 
proposal for the ECSC was that now the members of the coal and 
steel club could count on the support of their governments 
through the High Authority in eliminating impediments to producer 
control of markets, and, in ·particular, the smoothing out of 
transportation rates, the elimination of tariffs based on the 
needs for foreign exchange and of other economic interest groups, 
and the regulation of subsidies on a predictable basis. These 
results were welcomed by _the industries involved, openly outside 
of France.and secretly within it. As Monnet points out in his 
Memoirs the public opposition of the French steel producers was 
a tactical ploy that stemmed from resentment at not being·consulted 
during the negotiations that led to the formation of the ECSc.
48 
Privately, the men of the Plan received assurances of support 
all along. 
[ In 1950 there was in fact no alternative to Monnet•s 
. "functionalist" approach to solving-the Ruhr J?roblem. The U.S., 
whose influence in Europe wa.s then at an all-time peak,. _had tried 
and definitively failed to provide a solution. J?roposals to solve 
it based on international public control of industry, _al though 
laudatory in principle, had not the faintest chance of realization 
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and were also open to the objection that in the past similar 
approaches had not worked. Given the legacy of the recent war---
.., 
to put the matter bluntly, the popular hostility in France to 
most things German---the joint operation of a reformed IRA, with 
or without the nationalization of industry, .would have been a 
chimera.· 
But the heavy indu~try·cartels.of Western Europe during the 
interwar years, as well as their wartime extensions, represent 
a rare Franco-German success story •. They helped make it possible 
for the mines and foundries of the region to survive the Depression, 
even endure the general organized insanity of the war years. 
Understandings between industrialists concerning coal and steel 
indeed pro.vided one of the few "contact points" between the Reich 
and tne Western Democracies in the months prior to the war, 
were an important source for mutual cooperation during it, 
and left a legacy of goodwill which the German side proved able 
to draw on after it. They offered one of the few bases for a 
man of Schumann's convictions to build on. 
At the same time, the complic{ty of the Ruhr in Hitler's 
deeds and the collaboration of heavy industry in occupied Western 
Europe during the war·must give one pause. They underscore the 
necessity in ou:1: __ 9wn time bf maintaining, at the very least, effective 
public supel;'vision of such o:1='ganizations as the ECSC. 
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